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E-commerce platforms provide their customers with ranked lists of recommended items matching the customers’ preferences.
Merchants on e-commerce platforms would like their items to appear as high as possible in the top-N of these ranked lists. In this
paper, we demonstrate how unscrupulous merchants can create item images that artificially promote their products, improving their
rankings. Recommender systems that use images to address the cold start problem are vulnerable to this security risk. We describe a
new type of attack, Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP), that strikes directly at the core of Top-N recommenders: the ranking mechanism
itself. Existing work on adversarial images in recommender systems investigates the implications of conventional attacks, which target
deep learning classifiers. In contrast, our AIP attacks are embedding attacks that seek to push features representations in a way that
fools the ranker (not a classifier) and directly lead to item promotion. We introduce three AIP attacks insider attack, expert attack,
and semantic attack, which are defined with respect to three successively more realistic attack models. Our experiments evaluate the
danger of these attacks when mounted against three representative visually-aware recommender algorithms in a framework that uses
images to address cold start. We also evaluate two common defenses against adversarial images in the classification scenario and show
that these simple defenses do not eliminate the danger of AIP attacks. In sum, we show that using images to address cold start opens
recommender systems to potential threats with clear practical implications. To facilitate future research, we release an implementation
of our attacks and defenses, which allows reproduction and extension.
1 INTRODUCTION
Image content is considered a promising means to address the cold start problem of recommender systems [15, 18, 23].
In this paper, we show that the use of image content for cold start opens recommenders to vulnerabilities in the form
of adversarial items. Adversarial examples are deliberately designed samples that cause a machine learning system
to make mistakes. In the computer vision community, adversarial images have been shown to be a security issue for
classification systems [3, 32]. Here, we demonstrate that there are actually vulnerabilities that go beyond classification
and exist at the core of the recommender system, interfering with the ranking mechanism. There has been a limited
amount of previous work on the danger of adversarial images for recommender systems [11, 33]. However, until now,
this work have focused on classification-related issues or adversarial training for general performance improvement.
The main contribution of this paper is to reveal the vulnerabilities that arise when images are used to address cold start
in recommender systems and to show that simple solutions will not solve them.
In the recommender system community, a sizeable amount of research has been devoted to the security and robustness
of recommender system algorithms [5, 8, 19, 24, 25]. Most work, however, focuses on vulnerabilities related to user
profiles. Early work looked at shilling [19], which uses fake users. Shilling was later generalized to profile injection
attacks [24]. In our work, in contrast, we are looking at attackers who have the power to manipulate items directly, and,
specifically, to choose item images. In other words, instead of looking at profile injection attacks we are looking at an
item representation attacks. Concretely, the risk of such attacks presents itself in the case of e-commerce platforms that
sell the items of individual merchants, e.g., e-commerce or customer to customer (C2C) marketplaces. The merchants
create their own item description, including images. We show that if such merchants act unscrupulously they can
artificially promote their items and compromise the security of the recommender system .
Authors’ address: Zhuoran Liu, z.liu@cs.ru.nl; Martha Larson, m.larson@cs.ru.nl, Radboud University, Netherlands.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
01
88
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
R]
  2
 Ju
n 2
02
0
2Florsheim Men's 
Welter Bike Slip Slip-On
Timberland Men’s Altamont 
Fisherman Sandal
Skechers Men's Go Walk 2
Men's Born Full - Grain 
Leather Donjon Carmel
Born Men's 
Herschel Sandal
Timberland Watercrest
Fisherman Sandal
Clarks Men's Swing Sky
Fisherman Sandal
Clarks Men's Shiply Step
Slip-On Loafer
Rockport Men's Palm 
Street Fisherman Sandal
O'Neill Men's 
Southport, Khaki
Dockers Men's 
Bootie Slipper
Florsheim Men's 
Welter Bike Slip Slip-On
Timberland Men’s Altamont 
Fisherman Sandal
Skechers Men's Go Walk 2
Men's Born Full - Grain 
Leather Donjon Carmel
Born Men's 
Herschel Sandal
Timberland Watercrest
Fisherman Sandal
Clarks Men's Swing Sky
Fisherman Sandal
Clarks Men's Shiply Step
Slip-On Loafer
Rockport Men's Palm 
Street Fisherman Sandal
O'Neill Men's 
Southport, Khaki
Adversarial  
item image
Cooperative 
item image
Cold item 
injection
Candidate  
items for  
ranking
Personalized 
item  
ranking
Dockers Men's 
Bootie Slipper
Fig. 1. The cooperative cold item image and its correspond-
ing adversarial cold item image are shown at the top. After
injecting the cold item into the candidate set, which is gen-
erated by a first-stage ranker (here, BPR), a visually-aware
second-stage ranker (here, DVBPR) ranks the cooperative
item low and the adversarial item high in the final personal-
ized ranking of items. (This diagram shows a real example.
The adversarial item image is generated by our INSA attack
with ϵ = 32 and epoch = 5 explained in detail in Section 4.1).
Notation Explanation
U,I user and item set
Icold cold item set
θu ,θi content embedding for user and item
γu ,γi latent embedding for user and item
Φf ,Φe neural network for feature extraction embedding
Xi ∈ R224×224×3 product image for item i
Xhook ∈ R224×224×3 hook item
δ adversarial image perturbations
ϵ restriction threshold of L∞ norm
pu,i preference prediction for user-item pair (u, i)
∆u,i prediction shift for user-item pair (u, i)
∆i average prediction shift for item i
Xadvi ∈ R224×224×3 adversarial product image for item i
Table 1. Notations used in this paper.
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanics of the attack that we consider in this paper, called an Adversarial Item Promotion
(AIP) attack. On the left, we see personalized item ranking for a user when the recommender system is not under attack
(i.e., the cold start item is a “cooperative itemâĂŹâĂŹ). On the right, we see the ranking when the recommender system
is under attack by an unscrupulous merchant, who has used a manipulated image in an item representation (i.e., the
cold start item is an âĂĲadversarial itemâĂİ). This cold item setup assumes that the recommender system platform
wants to add a certain number of cold items to the personalized ranked lists of users in order to allow the items to start
accumulating interactions. In Figure 1, we see the case of a single cold item and a single user. A set of “candidate items
for ranking" for that user has been selected using a conventional personalized Top-N recommender. Then the cold item
is injected into that set. Finally, a visually-aware personalized Top-N recommender is used to rank the candidate item
set before it is presented to the user. In Figure 1 (left) we see that in the case of the cooperative image, the cold item
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lands somewhere in the ranked list, but probably not at the top. In contrast, in Figure 1 (right) we see that in the case of
the adversarial image, the cold item lands at the top of the personalized item ranking.
The overall impact of the attack depends on the accumulated effect of the attack over all users, and not just a single
instance of the attack, which is shown in Figure 1. Note that the final rank position of the cooperative vs. adversarial
item will be different for each instance of the attack. However, in general, if the adversarial item of an unscrupulous
merchant lands consistently farther towards the top of users’ personalized recommendation lists than it deserves to,
then, at large scale, the merchant will accrue considerable benefit. If we consider that a certain portion of the merchant’s
sales is correlated with rank-position, then the revenue of the merchant will increase. Also, the number of interactions
that the item receives will also increase. This means that the impact of the adversarial image is effectively translated
from the visual modality into the user-item interaction data, where it can increase the chance of the item to be selected
by the first-stage recommender. We do not quantify the rewards here, but we mention them because they provide
strong motivation for an unscrupulous merchant to invest time and effort in an AIP attack.
It is important to understand that the potential danger of AIP attacks extends beyond the specific cold-start setup
that we use in this paper. We choose a two-stage recommender, since they are used in industry [10, 34]. Also, with the
two-stage recommender we ensure that the adversarial item is competing against items that are already very relevant
to the user. This means that it is actually more difficult to promote an adversarial item in a two stage setup then it
would be if the injection occurred in a single-stage setup. In other words, our setup is realistic and mounting the attack
is non-trivial and has meaningful implications for real-world recommenders. We choose to focus on the cold-start
problem because of its importance for recommender systems. However, there is also another reason. A straightforward,
practical approach to blocking adversarial image promotion attacks on non cold start items is to prevent merchants
from being able to change images once their items have started to accumulate interactions. Cold start is the most
important moment of opportunity for a merchant to introduce an adversarial image into a representation. Every item
starts in some way cold, and the the issue particularly extreme in C2C marketplaces selling many unique items. In this
paper, we experimentally demonstrate the vulnerability of visually-aware recommenders. We also provide experimental
evidence that blocking AIP attacks in in cases of item cold start requires more than a simple defense. In short, the issues
we point out here require further attention from the research community.
We follow the standard procedure for security research. First, we specify a framework including the types of attacks
expected (attack models), the systems to be attacked, and a means of measuring the strength of attacks. Then, we
propose attacks for each attack model and evaluate their success. The systems that we attack are representative of
visually-aware recommender systems, i.e., a visual feature-based similarity model (AlexRank), a Collaborative-Filtering
(CF) model leveraging visual features (VBPR), and state-of-the-art learning-based neural model (DVPBR). This paper
makes the following contributions:
• We point out that the impact of adversarial images on recommender systems is not just a straightforward
translation of adversarial images from the computer vision, and may be more dangerous than we realize.
• We propose three Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP) attacks in a cold item scenario corresponding to three
different levels of knowledge and validate the effectiveness of proposed attacks on two real-world data sets.
• We show that the problem of AIP attacks is a serious one. Our experiments demonstrate that two defenses
commonly used for the classification problem will not eliminate the danger of AIP attacks.
• We release an implementation of our attacks and defenses that allows for testing and extension1.
1Our code is available at: https://github.com/liuzrcc/AIP
42 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Robustness of recommender system
The robustness of recommender systems has been widely studied in the past [5, 8, 19, 24, 25]. OâĂŹMahony et al.[25]
introduce the definition of recommender system robustness and present several attacks to identify characteristics
that influence robustness. Lam and Riedl [19] explore shilling attacks in recommend systems by evaluating the
recommendation performance under different scenarios. In particular, they find that new or obscure items are more
especially susceptible to attack, and they suggest that obtaining ratings from a trusted source for these items could make
them less vulnerable. Mobasher et al. [24] propose a formal framework to characterize different recommender system
attacks, and they also proposes an approach to detect attack profiles. In [24] and [5], evaluation metrics, e.g., hit rate
for item and prediction shift, for robustness of recommender system are discussed. Christakopoulou and Banerjee [8]
propose an automatic generative approach to generate fake user profiles to mount profile injection attack. Our “item
representation attack” is distinct from a “profile injection attack”, but both two kinds of attacks have similar impact
results, namely, pushing items that have been targeted for promotion.
2.2 Visually-aware recommender system
Previously, visually-aware recommender systems are systems that rely on visual content, usually in combination with
user-item interactions. Conventionally, visually-aware recommenders are developed on the basis of image retrieval
techniques. Given a query image, Kalantidis et al. [17] classify segmentation parts and retrieve visually similar items
within each of the predicted classes. Jagadeesh et al.[16] gather a large-scale dataset, Fashion-136K, with detailed
annotations and propose several retrieval-based approaches to recommend the missing part based on query image.
Going a step further, IBR [23] models human notions of similarity by considering alternative or complementary items.
Beyond similarity-based recommendation approaches, fashion or style characteristics approaches also play an
important role. Simo-Serra et al. [31] models how fashionable a person looks in an image, and it made fashion
recommendations based on the calculated fashionability scores. Combining the existing visual feature-based algorithm
and collaborative filtering approaches, VBPR [15] is devised to leverage both user feedback and visual features. Instead
of optimizing the matrix-factorization model in VBPR with pre-trained features, DVBPR [18] proposes an end-to-end
CNN-based framework and achieves state of the art results on several fashion recommendation data sets.
Apart from recommender systems that rely on visual information, several multi-modal approaches that also use other
auxiliary information are proposed in both academia and industry [4, 36, 37]. The popularity of modeling heterogeneous
information in recommender systems makes it crucial to re-consider the system robustness with respect to auxiliary
information sources.
2.3 Adversarial examples in machine learning
Adversarial examples are data samples that are deliberately designed in order to mislead machine learning algorithms.
Adversarial modifications strive to be imperceptible to humans, e.g., in images [32] and in audio [7]. For recommender
systems user acceptance, and not in imperceptibility is the key factor. We address this point by proposing a semantic
approach which circumvents the needs for perturbations.
A limited amount of work, as mentioned above, has addressed adversarial images for recommender systems. Some
work has focused on leveraging adversarial images to improve recommendation performance. Tang et al. [33] consider
the robustness of recommender systems against adversarial representation perturbations with the goal of improving
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the recommendation with adversarial training. In contrast to [33], who focus on increasing general recommendation
performance, our goal is to investigate security vulnerabilities of recommender systems.
The work most closely related to our own [11] looks only at classification-based issues. Di Noia et al. [11] propose
a new metric Category Hit Ratio and use two classification-based adversarial attacks to evaluate two visually-aware
recommender systems. In contrast to [11], we show that the problem of adversarial examples in recommender system
does not reduce to the problem of adversarial examples in classification.
3 FRAMEWORK
In this section, we introduce the framework in which the attack models are developed and evaluated. Figure 2 gives the
overview of the setup. As previously discussed, we use a two-stage approach. We use the first-stage recommender to
generate a personalized set of candidate items. For this purpose, we choose Bayesian Personalized Ranking (BPR) [28],
a representative CF model that is trained on the user-item interaction data. We use the visually aware second-stage
recommender to make a comparison between the cold start of a cooperative item and an adversarial item.
Section 3.1 presents the three attack models we investigate in this paper (the basis for creating three specific AIP
attacks, INSA, EXPA, and SEMA, explained in Section 4). Section 3.2 explains the three visually-aware recommenders
that we attack. Finally, the evaluation of the attacks is explained in more detail in Section 3.3. Frequently used notations
are summarized in Table 1.
General Knowledge Visual featureextraction model Embeddings
High-knowledge attack model
(corresponds to INSA cf. Section 4.1) ×
Medium-knowledge attack model
(corresponds to EXPA cf. Section 4.2) × ×
Low-knowledge attack model
(corresponds to SEMA cf. Section 4.3) ×
Table 2. The attack models used to develop our AIP attacks.
Cooperative item Adversarial item
INSA
EXPA
SECA
AIP attacks
Rank
list
Rank
list
Compare metrics
BPR Candidate set
Personalized
ranker
AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
Visually-aware ranker
Fig. 2. Setup for attack and attack evaluation.
3.1 Attack Models
We define three attack model following the three dimensions relevant for trustworthy recommender systems [24]. The
Intent dimension captures the objective of the attacker. All our models use ‘push’ intent, i.e., attackers are merchants
who want their items promoted to higher ranks in usersâĂŹ personalized recommendation lists. The Knowledge
dimension captures how much information that the attacker has about the system being attacked. Our three attack
models correspond to three different levels of knowledge: high, medium, and low. The Scale dimension captures the
scope of the impact on the recommender system. In all our attack models, we assume an attack with minimum scale
that is not likely to be noticed. It is clear that the harm inflicted by the attack will increase with attack size.
Table 2 summarizes our attack models in terms of the level of knowledge involved. For our high-knowledge attack
model we assume that the attacker is an insider at the recommender system platform and has access to the user
6embeddings of the trained recommender model. This scenario is not particularly realistic, but it is important because it
demonstrates an upper bound for the potential damage that can be inflicted by an AIP attack.
Themedium- and low-knowledge attackmodels are more realistic and assume that the attacker has general knowledge
of the market in which the recommender system operates. In particular, the attacker must be able to identify (by
observing sales trends or advertising) at least one item that sells well on the platform. We refer to this item as a hook
item. The attack is strongest when the hook item image is an image used by the recommender, but could also be an
image of the item acquired elsewhere. As will be explained in Section 4, the adversarial item will use the hook item
to pull itself up in the ranked list. In the medium-knowledge attack model, in addition to general knowledge, the
attacker must have access to the pre-trained visual feature extractor used by the visually-aware recommender systems.
Recommender systems leveraging pre-trained visual feature extractor are prevalent in both academic research and
industry, e.g., [13, 15, 20, 23, 27, 30]. These models are often released as publicly available resources.
In general, we assume that the recommender system platform is so large and the turnover of items so fast that it is
impossible to manually vet all of the images representing items. We consider this assumption reasonable given the
known difficulty of filtering item collections for banned or unsafe products [2]. We also assume that users are relatively
insensitive to image quality. Computer vision research, as previously mentions, tends to focuses on ensuring that image
manipulations are as imperceptible as possible. Here, we only need to achieve acceptability: the item must be clearly
discernible in the adversarial image.
3.2 Visually-aware Recommender Systems
In this section, we introduce the three representative visually-aware recommender systems that we will attack in our
experiments. In particular, we introduce the visual feature-based similarity model (AlexRank), the CF model leveraging
visual features (VBPR), and state-of-the-art learning-based approach (DVBPR). We chose these recommenders because
they represent the three types of commonly used visually-aware recommender systems.
3.2.1 AlexRank. Image content retrieval-based recommendation is a nearest neighbour approach that ranks item by
visual similarity of product images. Given an image of item i , the average Euclidean distance between item i and all items
that user u has interacted with is calculated, so smaller distance resembles higher preference prediction. Equation 1
show the calculation of similarity predictor:
pu,i =
∑
j ∈Du
∥Φf (Xi ) − Φf (X j )∥2
|Du | , (1)
where Du is the set of items that user u has interacted with, and Xi ,X j represents the image of item i and j. Φf is the
pre-trained model for image feature extraction.
3.2.2 VBPR. Improved from BPR [28], VBPR [15] incorporates visual features into BPR model. By leveraging the image
features of pre-trained CNN models, VBPR improves the performance of BPR. The preference prediction of VBPR is
described in Equation 2:
pu,i = α + βu + βi + γ
T
u γi + θ
T
u (EΦf (Xi )), (2)
where θu is the user content embedding, and E is the parameter for visual feature. Φf (Xi ) represents the visual feature
of item Xi from pre-trained model Φf .
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3.2.3 DVBPR. Extended from VBPR, DVBPR [18] is a concise end-to-end model whose visual feature extractor is
trained directly in a pair-wise manner. DVBPR achieves the state-of-the-art performance on several data sets for
visually-aware recommendations. The preference prediction of DVBPR is described in Equation 3:
pu,i = θ
T
u Φe (Xi ), (3)
where θu is the user content embedding, and Φe (Xi ) is the item content embedding where the CNN model Φe is trained
directly in a pair-wise manner.
3.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our attacks by measuring their ability to raise the rank of adversarial cold-start items such that they are
promoted above cooperative cold start items in users’ recommended item lists. This corresponds to the ‘push’ intent of
our attack models, cf. Section 3.1. The strength of the push is related to the integrity dimension of machine learning
security security [1]. The change in rank of cold-start items is measured by the prediction shift and the change in hit
rate (HR@N), following the evaluation metrics for top-N recommender system robustness [24] and [5]. Equation 4
defines the average prediction shift ∆i for item i and also the mean average prediction shift for a set of cold items ∆cold.
p′u,i is the post-attack predictor score and pu,i is the original predictor score for item i .
∆i =
∑
u ∈U
(p′u,i − pu,i )
|U| ∆cold =
∑
i ∈Icold
∆i
|Icold |
, (4)
Equation 5 defines the average hit rate for item i (HRi@N ) in terms of the hit rate of item i for user u (Hu,i@N ). The
mean average hit rate for cold items (HRcold) averages HRi@N over all cold items that are tested. ∆
HR@N
test is the change
in hit rate.
HRi@N =
∑
u ∈U
Hu,i@N
|U| HRcold@N =
∑
i ∈Icold
HRi@N
|Icold |
∆HR@Ncold =
∑
i ∈Icold
HRadvi @N − HR
coop
i @N
|Icold |
(5)
In addition to the integrity dimension, the availability dimension is also important, since it relates to whether the
recommender system remains useful to merchants and customers while under attack. We measure integrity using the
test items (which are defined by the data set releases). Specifically, we calculate the change in hit rate when a test item
is in a candidate set with a collaborative cold item and when the same test item is in a candidate set with an adversarial
cold item.
4 ADVERSARIAL ITEM PROMOTION ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce three adversarial item promotion (AIP) attacks corresponding to the three attack models
previously introduced in Section 3.1.
4.1 Insider Attack (INSA)
The high-knowledge attack model assumes the attacker has insider access to the user embeddings of the trained model
(see Section 3.1). Recall that most visually-aware recommender systems model the visual content embedding together
with user content embedding (cf. Section 3.2). For instance, in DVBPR, the inner product of user embedding θu and
item embedding Φe (Xi ) represents the preference of user u on item i . We propose an insider attack (INSA) in which
the attacker uses the embeddings to create an adversarial image for the adversarial item. Specifically, the embeddings
8are used to generate perturbations δ that are added to the original image in order to create the adversarial image.
The perturbations are optimized such that the strength of preference for the item is maximized over all user profiles.
Formally, given a product image x i of item i , we optimize perturbations δ to increase the preference pu,i of all users on
item i . The optimization process is described in Equation 6:
δ ← argmax
δ
∑
u ∈U
exp (θTu Φe (x i + δ)), (6)
where θu is the user content embedding. The optimization can be implemented by mini-batch gradient descent, and it
stops until certain conditions are met, e.g., it reaches certain number of iterations.
4.2 Expert Attack (EXPA)
The medium-knowledge attack model assumes that the attacker can select a hook (i.e., popular) item and also has access
to the visual feature extraction model (see Section 3.1). We propose an expert attack (EXPA) in which the attacker
uses the hook item to mark the region of item space to which the adversarial item should be moved. Specifically, the
EXPA attack generates perturbations added to the original item in order to create the adversarial item by decreasing
the representation distance to the hook item.
Formally, generating an adversarial item image by EXPA is described in Equation 7:
δ ← argmin
δ
∥Φf (x ′i + δ) − Φf (xt )∥2, (7)
where Φf is the feature extraction model. The EXPA attack leverages the same mechanism as the targeted visual feature
attack proposed by [29]. The novelty of EXPA is its use of a hook image that moves the adversarial image in image
space in a way that makes it rise in personalized recommendation lists. Note that the hook image itself is not necessarily
present in candidate set, which is selected by BPR, and thereby also not in the recommendation lists.
Algorithm 1 describes the process to generate adversarial product images with INSA and EXPA. Xi is the original
image of cold item, and Xhook is the hook item. Φ is the neural network that extracts embeddings or features from
the image content. Our aim is to find perturbations δ that could increase the personalized preference predictions by
optimization through all user content embeddings (INSA) or targeting a hook item (EXPA). At the same time, we also
need to restrict the magnitude of δ with respect to L∞ norm to make these perturbations imperceptible. The resulting
adversarial image Xadv is the summation of the original image and the clipped perturbations.
4.3 Semantic Attack (SEMA)
The low-knowledge attack model assume nothing beyond general knowledge needed to choose hook items (see
Section 3.1). We propose a semantic attack (SEMA) uses the semantic content of the image, i.e., what is shown in the
image, in order to achieve the promotion of items. The attack differs considerably from INSA and EXPA, which add
perturbations to existing images without changing what the images depict.
Figure 3 (c) illustrates the semantic attack that we will test here, which we call composition semantic attack (c-SEMA).
With c-SEMA, the attacker creates an adversarial image by editing the original image into the hook-item image as an
inset. Here, the c-SEMA attack is promoting a pair of shoes and the hook-item is the jeans. A text (here, âĂĲmatch
your jeansâĂİ) can be included to contribute to the impression that the composite image is an standard attempt to raise
the interest of potential customers.
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial Item Promotion Attack
Input:
X: cold item image, Xhook: hook item image
δ : adversarial perturbations, ϵ : L∞ norm bound
Φ: neural network, θ : user content embedding
K : number of iterations
Output:
Xadv : adversarial product image
1: Initialize x ′0 ← X, xt ← Xhook, δ ← 0
2: for k ← 1 to K do
3: Update δ by Eq. (6)/Eq. (7) for INSA/EXPA attack ▷ Update δ by gradients
4: δ ← clip(δ ,−ϵ, ϵ) ▷ Make sure that the magnitude of perturbations are in pre-
defined L∞ norm range
5: x ′k ← x ′k−1 + δ
6: x ′k ← clip(x + δk , 0, 1)
7: end for
8: x ′k ← quantize(x ′k ) ▷ Ensure x ′k is valid
9: return Xadv ← x ′k is the adversarial product image that targets Xhook
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. Cooperative item image and corresponding adversarial item images by different approaches. INSA attack is based on Equation 6.
EXPA, c-SEMA and n-SEMA select a popular item, i.e., Levi’s 501 jeans, as the hook item. c-SEMA applies simple co-depiction approach,
and n-SEMA incorporates the target item in a more natural way.
Figure 3 (d) shows another type of semantic attack, which we call natural semantic attack (n-SEMA). Here, the
integration of the hook item is natural. n-SEMA images can be created in a photo studio or a professional photo editor.
We do not test them here, since creation is time consuming and we are using a cold item set of 1000 images. However,
an unscrupulous merchant would have the incentive to invest the time to create n-SEMA images. One highly successful
adversarial item image could already lead to increased buyers and increased profit.
The semantic attack is particularly interesting for two reasons. SEMA achieves the change in image embeddings
needed to push an adversarial image close to a hook image in image space by manipulating the depicted content of the
image. First, this means that there are no limits on the quality of a SEMA adversarial image. Contrast c-SEMA and
n-SEMA in Figure 3(c) and (d) with the INSA and EXPA photos in Figure 3(a) and (b). The item is visible in the image,
and consumers who decide to purchase the product will not find that they have been misled. However, the images are
not crisp, and contain artifacts. Second, the impact of a SEMA image attack is not dependent on the algorithm used by
the recommender systems. In fact, SEMA images can effectively attack any recommender system using visual features,
and not just systems using neural embeddings as studied here.
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Table 3. Statistics of the data sets
#Users #Items #Interactions
Amazon Men 34244 110636 254870
Tradesy.com 33864 326393 655409
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first introduce data set in Section 5.1 and implementation details in Section 5.2. Then, we carry
out experimental analysis on two real-world data sets and investigate the influence of hyper-parameter selections in
Section 5.3. Finally, we evaluate two defenses against AIP attacks in Section 5.4.
5.1 Data
5.1.1 Data sets. We perform our experiments on two data sets: Men’s Clothing in Amazon.com and Tradesy.com,
which are publicly available and widely used in visually-aware recommender system research. The statistics of the
two data sets are described in Table 3. Men’s Clothing category is an important subset of Amazon.com data set, where
the effectiveness of visual features have been validated in many works [15, 18, 23]. Tradesy.com is a c2c second-hand
clothing trading website where users can buy and sell fashion items. Its business mode also makes visually-aware cold
item recommendation crucial, because its ’one-off’ characteristics. For both datasets, one descriptive image is available
for each item, and we follow the protocol of [18] and treat usersâĂŹ review histories as implicit feedback. For each
user, one item is selected among all interacted items as the test item, so we have the same number of test items as the
number of users.
5.1.2 Cold item selection. To validate the efficiency of the attacks in cold start scenario, in each of Amazon Men and
Tradesy.com data sets, we randomly select 1000 cold items that users have never interacted with and leave them out as
the external cold item test set. These cold items are excluded from the training process. Later, they are injected as cold
items to the candidate item set before feeding into the visually-aware ranker.
5.2 Implementation
In the first stage, we use BPR to generate a candidate set of top thousand items that are selected by personalized
preference ranking. Here we use a set, which means that the original rank order is not taken into account by the
visually-aware recommender algorithm. Then we inject the test item in the top thousand candidate set and get a set of
1001 items for each user. To compare before and after the attack, we inject one cooperative cold item or its corresponding
adversarial item in the candidate set. For each cold item, we have two set of 1002 items, which includes one test item
and one cooperative item (or one adversarial cold item). We use three different visual ranking models, AlexRank, VBPR,
and DVBPR (see Section 3.2), to rank the 1002 items and evaluate with respect to both integrity and availability (see
Section 3.3).
5.2.1 Model Training. We implement BPR, AlexRank, VBPR, and DVBPR in PyTorch [26]. For the first stage model
BPR, we set the number of factors 64. Stochastic Gradient Desecent (SGD) is used to optimize BPR with learning rate
0.01 for Amazon Men and 0.5 for Tradesy.com, where weight decay for L2 penalty is set to 0.001 on both data sets. A
grid search of learning rate in {0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.005} and weight decay in {0.001, 0.0001, 0.0001}is conducted for both
VBPR and DVBPR to select hyper-parameters, and we select the model with best validation performance.
Adversarial Item Promotion 11
Table 4. Absolute mean average prediction shifts of adversarial cold items |∆cold |, where ↑ represents positive prediction shift (rank
increased) and ↓ represents negative prediction shift (rank decreased). Positive shift is a successful attack.
BPR + AlexRank (dim=2048) BPR + VBPR (#factors=100) BPR + DVBPR (#factors=100)
INSA EXPA c-SEMA INSA EXPA c-SEMA INSA EXPA c-SEMA
Amazon Men ↑16.13 ↑15.94 ↑11.1 ↑3.27 ↑3.16 ↑0.88 ↑13.54 ↑4.80 ↑4.82
Tradesy.com ↑26.89 ↓0.67 ↓3.44 ↓0.79 ↑1.60 ↑1.45 ↑3.64 ↑1.89 ↑1.19
5.2.2 Adversarial attacks. If not specially mentioned in our paper, the maximal size of perturbations ϵ for AIP attacks
is set to 32. In INSA, the number of epochs is set as 5 to control the attacking time, and our implementation takes about
4 hours to generate 1000 adversarial item images on a single GPU. We use the Adam optimizer with the leaning rate of
0.001 for DVBPR and 0.0001 for both VBPR and AlexRank. In EXPA, the hook items are “Levi’s Men’s 501 Original Fit
Jean” in Amazon Men and a gray coat in Tradesy.com. These two products are most commonly interacted items in
training data of these two data sets. Recall, however, that hooks can be chosen without direct access to interaction
statistics. We use a Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01, and the number of iterations is set 5000.
5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we mount AIP attacks and evaluate their effects within the framework described in Section 3.
5.3.1 Attack Evaluation. Table 4 shows the absolute mean average prediction shift ∆cold for cold-start items. The
upwards arrow represents a positive prediction shift, meaning that the attack successfully promoted the item. We see
that for nearly all combinations of AIP attack and visually-aware recommender system the attack is successful. The
high-knowledge attack INSA achieves a larger shift than EXPA or c-SEMA. c-SEMA is surprisingly successful given the
very minimal amount of knowledge that it requires. Note that that it is only meaningful to compare the size of the
prediction shift for the same recommender system and the same data set.
Table 5 shows the mean average hit rate HRcold@N for cold items and average hit rate HRtest@N for test items,
providing more insight into the attacks. The first row for each data set reports the hit rate of the original test items
in the case that no adversarial items have been added to the candidate set. The second row reports the hit rate of the
cooperative cold items when they are added to the candidate set. The rest of the rows report the hit rate of the test
items added to candidate set containing an adversarial cold items (“Test with” rows) and the hit rate of adversarial cold
items that have been created by the different attacks. Recall that measurements made on cold items reflect impact of the
attack on integrity and measurements made with test items reflect the impact on availability.
It can be observed that all AIP attacks are generally effective. For INSA, the attack is dramatic: On average, approxi-
mately 24660 users will find the adversarial cold item in top-5 ranking on Amazon Men data set, and the number before
the attack is 35. Since INSA uses the most knowledge, it is not surprising that it is the most effective attack. However,
even with much less available knowledge, both EXPA and c-SEMA pose a serious threat. For example, on Amazon Men
data set, c-SEMA pushes the cold item to the hit rate level of a popular hook item.
Another key observation is that although the goal of an AIP attack is to push adversarial items, the attack also
influences the performance of other items (cf. “Test with” rows). This means that unscrupulous merchants using AIP
attacks promote their own items at the measurable expense of other items, which at scale can impeded the functioning
of the entire recommender system.
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Table 5. Average HR@N of test item and cooperative (adversarial) cold item in AlexRank, VBPR and DVBPR. Three attacks, INSA
(ϵ = 32), EXPA (ϵ = 32) and c-SEMA, are evaluated on Amazon Men and Tradesy.com data sets.
AlexRank (dim=2048) VBPR (#factors=100) DVBPR (#factors=100)
HR@N HR@N HR@N
N = 5 N = 10 N = 20 N = 5 N = 10 N = 20 N = 5 N = 10 N = 20
Amazon Men
Original test 0.0195 0.0372 0.0681 0.0191 0.0373 0.0691 0.0187 0.0461 0.0808
Cooperative cold 0.0010 0.0023 0.0053 0.0017 0.0037 0.0082 0.0011 0.0038 0.0092
Test with INSA 0.0140 0.0423 0.0784 0.0190 0.0375 0.0676 0.0170 0.0352 0.0659
INSA adv cold 0.8296 0.8960 0.9365 0.2678 0.2939 0.3252 0.7211 0.7403 0.7605
Test with EXPA 0.0188 0.0461 0.0808 0.0198 0.0382 0.0684 0.0192 0.0369 0.0674
EXPA adv cold 0.0036 0.0057 0.0155 0.0150 0.0392 0.0904 0.0646 0.1284 0.2163
test with c-SEMA 0.0187 0.0461 0.0807 0.0198 0.0384 0.0685 0.0194 0.0371 0.0677
c-SEMA adv cold 0.0017 0.0071 0.0269 0.0027 0.0088 0.0274 0.0181 0.0572 0.1314
Tradesy.com
Original test 0.0338 0.0561 0.0869 0.0241 0.0439 0.0789 0.0234 0.0446 0.0819
Cooperative cold 0.0003 0.0013 0.0046 0.0022 0.0045 0.0096 0.0011 0.0026 0.0059
Test with INSA 0.0284 0.0526 0.0844 0.0224 0.0406 0.0707 0.0228 0.0439 0.0812
INSA adv cold 0.9399 0.9710 0.9843 0.0783 0.0965 0.1193 0.2711 0.2999 0.3326
Test with EXPA 0.0338 0.0561 0.0869 0.0228 0.0410 0.0710 0.0232 0.0445 0.0818
EXPA adv cold 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0048 0.0109 0.0234 0.0384 0.0602 0.0915
Test with c-SEMA 0.0338 0.0560 0.0870 0.0227 0.0410 0.0710 0.0234 0.0446 0.0819
c-SEMA adv cold 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048 0.0104 0.0218 0.0005 0.0016 0.0048
Table 6. Change in Average HR@5 before and after AIP attacks: Cold items (attack is successful HR@5 rises) and test items (successful
attacks cause a drop in HR@5).
Amazon Men Tradesy.com
AlexRank VBPR DVBPR AlexRank VBPR DVBPR
INSA adv cold vs. cooperative cold ↑0.8109 ↑0.2661 ↑0.7201 ↑0.939 ↑0.0761 ↑0.2700
EXPA adv cold vs. cooperative cold ↑ 0.0025 ↑0.0133 ↑0.0636 ↓0.0001 ↑0.0026 ↑0.0373
c-SEMA adv cold vs. cooperative cold ↑0.0006 ↑0.0010 ↑0.0171 ↓0.0003 ↑0.0026 ↓0.0006
INSA test vs. original test ↓0.0047 ↓0.0001 ↓0.0025 ↓0.0054 ↓0.0017 ↓0.0006
EXPA test vs. original test ↑0.0001 ↑0.0007 ↓0.0003 0.0000 ↓0.0013 ↓0.0002
c-SEMA test vs. original test 0.0000 ↑0.0007 ↓0.0001 0.0000 ↓0.0014 0.0000
Note that the different performance of EXPA and c-SEMA on Amazon Men and Tradesy is not caused by the
adversarial attack itself, rather the selection of the hook item. In Tradesy.com, the HR@N for the selected hook item
(which is a gray coat) is low, so after EXPA or c-SEMA, the rank does not increase dramatically.
Table 6 focuses in on the change in mean average hit rate ∆HR@Ncold and average hit rate change ∆
HR@N
test , so that
the magnitude of the change can be appreciated directly. INSA has the largest positive effect on the adversarial item
and largest negative effect on the test items. Again, the c-SEMA attack is surprisingly effective, given the minimal
knowledge it involves. Remember that the recommender system platforms we are concerned about are enormous, and
even a small boost in average rank of the magnitude of that afforded by c-SEMA could translate in to a substantial
increase in interactions and profit.
Figure 4 shows a 2-D visualization of the image space defined by the DVBPR item embeddings. It allows us to directly
observe the influences of different AIP attacks. The position of the original image (a cooperative image) is shown by 1○.
We can see that it is positioned next to items with which it is visually similar. The attacks move this image to the other
positions. The hook item is a pair of jeans. We can see that EXPA, c-SEMA, and n-SEMA push the cold item to a cluster
related to the hook item. Note that it is difficult to reason about the position of INSA, since it is optimized with respect
to user embeddings.
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Fig. 4. t-SNE [21] 2-D visualization of item embedding by pre-trained DVBPR model (#factors = 100) for randomly selected 1000
items in Amazon Men data set, cooperative item ( 1○) embedding and its corresponding adversarial item embedding. Attacks include
generated INSA ( 2○), EXPA ( 3○ ), c-SCA ( 4○) and n-SCA ( 5○ ).
5.3.2 Influence of hyper-parameters. We mount attacks to models with reduced length embedding length. We conduct
experiments for different numbers of factors for VBPR in {20, 50, 100}, and DVBPR {10, 30, 50, 100}, It is found that the
recommender system with smaller embedding length is more susceptible to attacks.
We also investigate how the magnitude of ϵ influences the adversarial strength, we carry out experiments with ϵ in
{4, 8, 26, 32} for INSA and EXPA. We found that increasing ϵ from 4 to 32 leads to improved adversarial effects, but large
perturbation size is not necessary in most cases for a successful attack. In other words, the artifacts visible in Figure 3
(a) and (b) represent a worse-case scenario. Approaches that make adversarial images large yet imperceptible [38] can
also be incorporated to boost AIP attacks and further eliminate artifacts.
5.4 Defense
In the computer vision literature, simple defences have been shown to be effective against adversarial images that
cause neural classifiers to misclassify [9, 12, 14, 35]. Here, we evaluated two common defenses: JPEG compression
and bit depth reduction in order to test whether they are effective against AIP attacks. These are known to be able to
erase the effect of image perturbations, which are used by INSA and EXPA. We carried out an evaluation by applying
progressively stronger versions of the defense to adversarial images. We used a 100-item subset of our larger test set.
We do not evaluate SEMA, since the semantic attack does not involve perturbations and if these defenses would destroy
the effectiveness of SEMA they would also destroy the usefulness of cooperative images.
In Table 7, we visualize the level of strength of defense that must be applied to the adversarial image in order for its
rank to be lowered to the average HR@5 of a cooperative image. If the defenses presented a surefire defense against
adversarial item images (as they are for many classification algorithms), then we would expect the ▲ and⋆ to appear
consistently to the far left in the boxes. This is clearly not the case. We see in Table 7 that INSA is more difficult to defeat
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Table 7. Visualization of the level at which a defense is successful at lowering the HR@5 of an adversarial cold-start item equal or
less the average HR@5 of a cooperative cold-start item. For JPEG compression, levels are specified as compression percents and for
Bit depth reduction levels are specified as number of bits in with which the image is encoded. (▲: Amazon.com;⋆: Tradesy.com)
JPEG compression Bit depth reduction
90 70 50 30 10 7 6 5 4 3 2
AlexRank INSAEXPA ▲
VBPR INSAEXPA ▲⋆ ▲⋆
DVBPR INSA ⋆EXPA ▲ ▲⋆
than EXPA, which is expected because it leverages insider knowledge of the recommender system. However, EXPA is
clearly not easy to beat across the board. Our overall conclusion is that it is non-trivial to defeat INSA and EXPA in a
cold start situation and that the recommender research community must devote more effort to solving the problem.
It is important to note that this test is a strong one. If these defenses would be applied in practice, they would need
to be applied to all images and not just adversarial images. Image content becomes indistinguishable as compression
increases, and an image 10% the size of the original image or encoded with only 2-3 bits can be expected to contain
little to no item information.
Another possible approach would be to train a gateway classifier that would screen for adversarial images at the
moment that merchants upload them to the recommender system platform. It is clear that for SEMA such a classifier
would be difficult to build, since SEMA attacks are created in a natural manner and are indistinguishable from cooperative
images. For INSA and EXPA, a gateway filter could be build if the exact specifications of the adversarial attack, including
the parameter settings were known. The number of possible variants on INSA and EXPA attacks is so large, however,
that it would be prohibitive to try to guess the parameters.
6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper has investigated the vulnerabilities at the core of Top-N recommenders that use images to address cold start.
We have shown that Adversarial Item Promotion (AIP) attacks allow unscrupulous merchants to artificially raise the
rank of their products when a visually-aware recommender systems is used for candidate ranking. The evidence from
our investigation leads us to conclude that AIP attacks are a potential threat with clear practical implications. Our
work reveals that the promise of hybrid recommender systems to provide a higher degree of robustness [24] is not an
absolute, and that we must proceed with caution when using images to address cold start.
Future work must develop effective defenses against AIP attacks. One approach, already mentioned above, is to
use a gateway classifier to flag adversarial images at the moment merchants upload them. Unfortunately, AIP attacks
can bypass such a classifier by constructing new loss functions [6]. Another approach is adversarial training, which
has proved an effective way to increase robustness against adversarial examples [22]. This solution requires vast
computational resources and the resulting system achieves robustness at the risk of sacrificing the original performance.
Future work must look at the impact of multipliers. If a single item has multiple descriptive images, attacks are more
likely to go unnoticed, in particular semantic attacks that require no perturbations. Further, multiple merchants (or fake
merchant profiles) could collaborate in a collusion attack.
Finally, we note that although, here, we have focused on e-commerce, entertainment recommender systems are
vulnerable: an adversarial signal could be embedded into a thumbnail or the content itself. In sum, AIP attacks constitute
an important, practical risk of using images in recommender systems and serious challenges remain to be addressed.
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